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Introduction 
In June of 2014, James McLeod went to the doctor seeking 
treatment for his non-life-threatening atrial fibrillation (“AFib”) and 
was prescribed amiodarone tablets.1 After over a year of treatments, 
McLeod noticed that he had not only failed to see any improvements 
in his condition, but instead felt that his symptoms were worsening.2 
He began to feel a shortness of breath, wheezing, and coughing among 
other physical ailments until he was eventually admitted to a local 
 
1. McLeod v. Sandoz, Inc., No. 16-CV-01640, 2017 WL 1196801, at *2 (D.S.C. 
Mar. 31, 2017). 
2. Id. 
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hospital in March of 2015.3 It was then that he discovered that his 
physical condition had deteriorated so drastically due to amiodarone 
toxicity.4 After being prescribe amiodarone just two years prior, 
McLeod developed Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease, known as 
COPD.5 
McLeod subsequently discovered that his prescription was for an 
“off-label” use of amiodarone.6 In the everyday practice of medicine, 
physicians are tasked with treating a diverse body of patients. Typ–
ically, physicians can follow standard treatment protocols because they 
are treating the average patient with a given condition. But physicians 
may also be faced with patients who have unique needs that cannot be 
treated with ordinary methods. In these circumstances, physicians must 
use their expertise and discretion to innovatively develop treatment 
plans for the unique needs of their patients. Often, physicians will do 
so by prescribing a drug for an off-label use.7 
When the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) reviews new 
drugs for market approval, it only grants approval based on “label” 
uses, which are specific uses for certain patient populations (among 
other criteria).8 When a physician prescribes a drug for an off-label use, 
the physician is still prescribing an FDA-approved drug, only the FDA 
did not approve the drug for that specific use.9 As such, the drug did 
not go through efficacy trials for the off-label use as it would for an 
approved, label use, and its prescription does not include information 
about side effects and risks.10 As in McLeod’s case, physicians often do 






7.  See Katrina Furey & Kirsten Wilkins, Prescribing “Off-Label”: What 
Should a Physician Disclose?, 18 AMA J. Ethics 587, 588–89 (2017); see 
also Understanding Unapproved Use of Approved Drugs “Off Label,” U.S. 
Food & Drug Admin., https://www.fda.gov/patients/learn-about-expan 
ded-access-and-other-treatment-options/understanding-unapproved-use-
approved-drugs-label [https://perma.cc/XC68-5REX] (last updated Feb. 5, 
2018).  
8. See Understanding Unapproved Use of Approved Drugs “Off Label,” supra 
note 7.  
9. 2 James T. O’Reilly & Katharine A. Van Tassel, Food and Drug 
Administration § 15:59 (4th ed. 2020). 
10. Furey & Wilkins, supra note 7, at 588–90. 
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partly because off-label drug use is common.11 It is estimated that as 
many as one in five prescriptions are for an “off-label” use of a drug.12 
Here, McLeod’s doctors prescribed amiodarone, the generic version 
of Cordarone. Cordarone is manufactured and distributed by Wyeth as 
a first line of therapy for ventricular fibrillation.13 Since amiodarone is 
the generic version of a brand-name drug, the FDA requires that the 
label is identical to the label of its brand equivalent.14 This means that 
the generic drug manufacturer can only provide label information (e.g., 
a description of the drug, warnings, adverse side effects) that is 
consistent with its brand equivalent.15 Additionally, the label can 
include only the FDA-approved uses of the drug.16 Therefore, the brand 
drug company is prohibited from advertising or distributing information 
(including risks) about an off-label use of a drug and as a result the 
generic equivalent is effectively restricted from distributing warnings 
about any off-label uses. 
In this case, the manufacturer of the brand drug, Wyeth, received 
FDA approval only for Cordarone’s use “as a drug of ‘last resort’ for 
patients suffering from documented recurrent life-threatening ventric–
ular fibrillation and ventricular tachycardia.”17 But Wyeth used a 
promotional campaign to market the off-label use of Cordaone as a first 
line of therapy for anti-arrhythmic benefits.18 This off-label promotion 
is how McLeod came to be prescribed amiodarone since, when he first 
sought treatment, he was able to manage his AFib and did not need 
amiodarone for the label use of last-resort medical treatment.19 Instead, 
McLeod’s prescription of amiodarone was for the off-label use as a first 
 
11. Id. at 588, 590. 
12. Elizabeth Richardson, Health Policy Brief: Off-Label Drug Promotion, 
Health Affs., June 30, 2016, at 1, https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10. 
1377/hpb20160630.920075/full/healthpolicybrief_159.pdf [https://perma. 
cc/DG9X-Q3AF]. 
13. McLeod v. Sandoz, Inc., No. 16-CV-01640, 2017 WL 1196801, at *1 (D.S.C. 
Mar. 31, 2017). 
14. Generic Drug Facts, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., https://www.fda.gov/ 
drugs/generic-drugs/generic-drug-facts [https://perma.cc/P9UU-K6MQ] 
(last updated June 1, 2018). 
15. Drugs@FDA: What’s in a Drug Product Label?, U.S. Food & Drug 
Admin., https://www.fda.gov/drugs/drug-approvals-and-databases/drugs 
fda- whats-drug-product-label [https://perma.cc/25AY-92Y2] (last updated 
May 6, 2016). 
16. See 2 O’Reilly & Van Tassel, supra note 9, § 15:19. 
17. McLeod, 2017 WL 1196801, at *1. 
18. Id. 
19. Id. 
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line of therapy.20 As a result of his injuries from the off-label use, 
McLeod sued the manufacturer of amiodarone for allegedly causing him 
to develop COPD.21 
Despite his injuries, McLeod and others similarly situated face an 
uphill battle when litigating against pharmaceutical manufacturers. 
Across the country, plaintiffs struggle to hold drug manufacturers liable 
for injuries either caused by the manufacturer’s promotion of a drug for 
an off-label use or deceptive marketing practices that misled consumers 
about the risks inherent to the drug.22 In part, this is because of the 
learned intermediary doctrine, a decades-old legal doctrine that helps 
shield drug manufacturers from liability.23 
The potential holes in liability created by the learned intermediary 
doctrine illustrate a larger issue in physician prescribing practices for 
off-label uses. Namely, that physicians are not held accountable for 
collecting patient data when they use reasonable innovation and pres–
cribe a treatment off-label.24 This absence of data has multiple 
implications. First, if the patient suffers an adverse outcome from using 
the drug off-label, the physician has no risk data that could help the 
patient substantiate a case against the prescription drug manufacturer. 
Relatedly, since manufacturers do not have their own risk data for off-
label uses available because of FDA requirements, they can escape 
liability by claiming they had no knowledge of the risks involved.25 
Further, when physicians prescribe a drug off-label for all of their 
patients with a certain condition without registering with an 
Institutional Review Board (“IRB”) and tracking the results, they are 
engaged in illegal human experimentation.26 
 
20. Id. at *1–2. 
21. Id. at *1. 
22. See 2 O’Reilly & Van Tassel, supra note 9, §§ 15:69, 26:1–2. Plaintiffs 
must show that a defendant manufacturer actually marketed and promoted 
a drug for its off-label use in violation of FDCA. Carson v. Depuy Spine, 
Inc., 365 F. App’x 812, 815 (9th Cir. 2010). 
23.  See infra Part II. 
24.  See Rebecca Dresser & Joel Frader, Off-Label Prescribing: A Call for 
Heightened Professional and Government Oversight, 37 J. Law Med. 
Ethics 476, author manuscript at 6 (2009), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/ 
pmc/articles/PMC2836889/pdf/nihms-180818.pdf [https://perma.cc/VQF 
5-RFNP]; see also C. Lee Ventola, Off-Label Drug Information: Regulation, 
Distribution, Evaluation, and Related Controversies, 34 Pharmacology & 
Therapeutics 428, 432 (2009) (underscoring that physicians often fail to 
implement evidence-based strategies when prescribing off-label).  
25. See Ventola, supra note 24, at 431 (describing avenues through which 
prescription drug manufacturers evade conducting renewed clinical research 
for off-label uses).  
26. See Todd W. Rice, How to do Human-Subjects Research if You do not Have 
an Institutional Review Board, 53 Respiratory Care 1362, 1363 (2008), 
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To better protect patients, physicians should have access to a 
coordinated system of data collection for off-label prescriptions. If 
physicians are going to be prescribing off-label anyway, the best prac–
tice is to track information throughout the process. This data collection 
can be executed by implementing patient registries. To use patient 
registries, physicians must obtain the patient’s informed consent, both 
to the off-label treatment and to submitting the patient’s health 
information to the registry. This registry can then alert physicians of 
trends in adverse patient outcomes, which the physicians can then 
timely disclose to their patients. The registry can also send this patient 
data to the FDA for label change considerations. Further, the increased 
reliance on patient registries will diminish a drug manufacturer’s ability 
to circumvent FDA regulations by claiming the risk information was 
not knowable because the registries are collecting it for them. 
This Note will first address the regulatory and legal doctrines at 
play when a plaintiff attempts to recover from injuries caused by a 
prescription drug manufacturer: Part II examines the learned inter–
mediary doctrine, Part III considers direct-to-consumer marketing, and 
Part IV reviews “off-label” drug promotion. In Part V, this Note 
recommends implementing patient registries whenever physicians are 
prescribing a drug off-label. The data collected by patient registries can 
protect patients without disrupting or adding an exception to the 
learned intermediary doctrine. 
II. Learned Intermediary Doctrine 
Under the regime for defective products liability, the Restatement 
(Third) of Torts outlines the potential liability for harm caused by 
prescription drug manufacturers. “A manufacturer of a prescription 
drug . . . who sells or otherwise distributes a defective drug . . . is 
subject to liability for harm to persons caused by the defect. A 
prescription drug . . . is one that may be legally sold or otherwise 
distributed only pursuant to a health-care provider’s prescription.”27 A 
prescription drug manufacturer can avoid liability by invoking the 
learned intermediary doctrine (“LID”). According to the LID, if a 
manufacturer communicates the risks of a drug to the prescribing 
physician, then the manufacturer has no duty to warn the patient 
 
http://www.rcjournal.com/contents/10.08/10.08.1362.pdf [https://perma 
.cc/DT3B-873P]; see Ventola, supra note 24, at 439. 
27. Restatement (Third) of Torts: Prods. Liab. § 6(a) (Am. L. Inst. 
1998). 
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directly.28 The healthcare provider is then considered a “learned 
intermediary” between the manufacturer and the consumer.29 
A. Liability Under the Learned Intermediary Doctrine 
The LID is based on the presumption that healthcare providers are 
the ones best suited to evaluate and weigh the attendant risks and 
benefits of a given drug for each individual patient.30 This presumption 
thereby creates a duty for the healthcare provider to relay relevant 
information to the patient so the patient can make informed treatment 
decisions.31 Through the LID, prescription drug manufacturers effec–
tively discharge their duty to give warnings to the consumer by 
providing warnings to the healthcare provider. “A prescribing physician 
who has been adequately warned about a drug’s risks breaks ‘the causal 
link between the manufacturer and the plaintiff, thereby insulating the 
manufacturer from tort liability for harm caused by the drug.’”32 If a 
manufacturer fulfills its duty to warn the prescribing physician, then 
the manufacturer has a strong defense against liability33 because “[t]he 
learned intermediary doctrine precludes a tort plaintiff from recovering 
for any injuries sustained from use of the drug unless she can show that 
the warnings were inadequate as to prescribing physicians.”34 
If a plaintiff can persuade a court that her injuries were caused by 
the manufacturer’s failure to adequately warn the learned intermediary, 
then the manufacturer may be held liable.35 Conversely, if the manu–
facturer provided adequate warnings to the intermediary, but the 
intermediary failed to adequately communicate these risks to the 
patient, then the patient can only make a claim against the healthcare 
 
28. See 2 O’Reilly & Van Tassel, supra note 9, § 15:25.  
29. See Restatement (Third) of Torts: Prods. Liab. § 6 reporters’ note 
to cmt. d (Am. L. Inst. 1998). 
30. Id. § 6 cmt. b. 
31. Id. There may be some limited circumstances when drugs will be admin–
istered to patients without prior evaluation by a healthcare provider (e.g., 
mass vaccinations administered in clinics); thus, it will be appropriate for 
the manufacturer to warn the patient directly in some instances. See id. 
§ 6(d)(2) & cmt. e. 
32. 2 O’Reilly & Van Tassel, supra note 9, § 26:52 (quoting Zanzuri v. G.D. 
Searle & Co., 748 F. Supp. 1511, 1515 (S.D. Fla. 1990)). 
33. Dan B. Dobbs, Paul T. Hayden & Ellen M. Bublick, Dobbs’ Law 
of Torts § 466 (2d ed. 2020). 
34. 2 O’Reilly & Van Tassel, supra note 9, § 26:52. 
35. See id.; see also Simon v. Wyeth Pharm., Inc., 989 A.2d 356, 375–76 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 2009) (finding that the plaintiff satisfied the causation require–
ment by presenting evidence that her doctor would not have prescribed a 
hormone-replacement drug had its manufacturer informed doctor of the risk 
of breast cancer). 
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provider who acted as the intermediary, not the manufacturer.36 The 
manufacturer satisfies its duty under the LID once it has provided 
information about the risks to the physician; “[w]hether the physician 
in fact reads the warning, or passes its contents along to the recipient 
of the drug is irrelevant.”37 
A prescription drug manufacturer’s duty to warn of the risks of its 
drug is limited to the risks that are reasonably foreseeable at the time 
of sale.38 From a public policy perspective, courts do not want to impose 
liability for unforeseeable risks at the expense of discouraging the devel–
opment and sale of new drugs into the market.39 Drug manufacturers 
are still responsible for performing reasonable tests for risks before their 
drug goes to market, but it would be impossible for manufacturers to 
accurately insure against unknowable risks.40 Accordingly, the LID 
provides a broad shield of protection for prescription drug manufac–
turers from injured consumers. 
Traditionally, drug manufacturers have been held liable only for 
harm caused by their products in two situations: (1) when their drug 
contains a manufacturing defect; and (2) when their drug is sold 
without the manufacturer supplying adequate warnings to the 
prescribing physician.41 Of particular import in this discussion is the 
more recent practice of imposing liability for “defectively designed” 
products. Unlike other forms of product liability, courts have relied 
upon the LID to shield drug manufacturers from tort liability, in part, 
because of the unique characteristics inherent in prescription drugs, i.e., 
a drug that may cause harm to one patient may be beneficial to 
another.42 Because of this, the Restatement characterizes a drug as a 
“defective[ly] design[ed]” product only when the risk of harm is so great 
in comparison to the potential benefits that no “reasonable health-care 
provider[], knowing of such foreseeable risks and therapeutic benefits, 
would . . . prescribe the drug . . . for any class of patients.”43 Put 
another way, even if a drug is harmful to some patients, it is not 
 
36. Dobbs et al., supra note 33, § 466. 
37. Guarino v. Wyeth, LLC, 719 F.3d 1245, 1250 (11th Cir. 2013) (quoting 
E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc. v. Farnes, 697 So. 2d 825, 827 (Fla. 1997)). 
38. Restatement (Third) of Torts: Prods. Liab. § 6 cmt. g (Am. L. 
Inst. 1998). 
39. See id. 
40. Id. 
41. Id. cmt. a. Note that non-prescribing healthcare providers, for example doc–
tor’s assistants, must also be warned if they interact with the patient in a 
decision-making capacity. Id. reporters’ note to cmt. d (citing McEwen v. 
Ortho Pharm. Corp., 528 P.2d 522, 529 (Or. 1974)). 
42. Id. cmt. b. 
43. Id. § 6(c).  
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considered defectively designed if it is an effective treatment for any 
other class of patients.44 If a plaintiff can meet this high bar and prove 
that a prescription drug was defectively designed, then the manufac–
turer will be held liable for the harm caused by the negligent design.45 
Over the past few decades, state courts across the country have 
cited a myriad of reasons to support their reliance on the LID.46 Most 
notably, courts have cited the lack of feasibility for manufacturers to 
communicate warnings directly to consumers,47 the marked interference 
such warnings could have on the doctor-patient relationship,48 the 
concern that warnings would “drive some patients to hysteria,”49 and 
the presumption that the manufacturer can reasonably rely on the 
intermediary to communicate risks to the patient and that the patient 
will correspondingly rely on the intermediary’s advice.50 In response, 
critics of the courts’ continued invocation of the LID assert that 
healthcare providers cannot be reasonably relied upon to communicate 
 
44. Id. cmt. b. 
45. Marroquin v. Pfizer, Inc., 367 F. Supp. 1152, 1163–64 (E.D. Cal. 2019); 
Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 402A cmt. k (Am. L. Inst. 1965) 
(“The seller of such products, again with the qualification that they are 
properly prepared and marketed, and proper warning is given, where the 
situation calls for it, is not to be held to strict liability for unfortunate 
consequences attending their use, merely because he has undertaken to supply 
the public with an apparently useful and desirable product, attended with a 
known but apparently reasonable risk.”). 
46. Dobbs et al., supra note 33, § 466 (“Courts have asserted several reasons 
for the learned-intermediary rule.”). 
47. Id. (“They have said for example that warnings to the consumer are not 
feasible . . . .”). 
48. In re Certified Questions, 358 N.W.2d 873, 883 (Mich. 1984) (Boyle, J., 
dissenting) (expressing the concern that, in some instances, directly warning 
the patient “could potentially cause undue interference with the doctor-
patient relationship [and] cause patient confusion”). 
49. Dobbs et al., supra note 33, § 466. 
50. Id. (citing Larkin v. Pfizer, Inc., 153 S.W.3d 758, 763–64 (Ky. 2004); 
MacDonald v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 394 N.E.2d 131, 136 (Mass. 1985)); see 
also West v. Searle & Co., 806 S.W.2d 608, 613–14 (Ark. 1991) (reasoning 
that the provider is the best at assessing risks and benefits); Brown v. 
Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470, 478–79 (Cal. 1988) (expressing the concern 
that increasing manufacturer liability would increase drug prices and make 
them less available); Niemiera v. Schneider, 555 A.2d 1112, 1118 n.3 (N.J. 
1989) (relying on the FDA’s existing regulatory framework as an already 
incredibly detailed system to set and control standards for safety, efficacy 
and labeling); Gravis v. Parke-Davis & Co., 502 S.W.2d 863, 870 (Tex. 
App. 1973) (relying on the system of drug and healthcare administration to 
hold those in such professions accountable). 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 71·Issue 2·2020 
The Learned Intermediary Doctrine in the Digital World 
827 
drug risks to patients.51 Those scholars have argued that the high-
pressure and time-crunched schedules of physicians may actually make 
them unreliable intermediaries, consequently making it much less 
reasonable for drug manufacturers to rely upon physicians to pass on 
adequate risk information to consumers.52 If this rationale is assumed, 
it would undermine the presumption that the prescribing physician is 
a reliable intermediary, which is critical to the logic of the LID. 
An essential rationale for the LID is that prescribing physicians 
have specialized knowledge.53 In Tutwiler v. Sandoz, Inc.,54 the Eleventh 
Circuit’s decision turned on the important distinction between a 
manufacturer’s failure to warn the physician and the physician’s failure 
to change her prescribing behavior based on a manufacturer’s warning. 
“The adequacy of the manufacturer’s warning is ‘measured by its effect 
on the physician . . . to whom it owed a duty to warn, and not by its 
effect on the consumer.’”55 In Tutwiler, the plaintiff suffered pulmonary 
complications after taking amiodarone for her non-life-threatening 
atrial fibrillation.56 The plaintiff alleged that because she did not receive 
the manufacturer’s Medication Guide from her physician, she was not 
fully aware of the risks of the drug.57 The court dismissed the plaintiff’s 
claims by applying the LID, reasoning that it is not enough for the 
plaintiff to argue that she herself would have acted differently if she 
had received different information; rather, plaintiffs must present 
evidence that the prescribing physician would have made a different 
treatment decision had the physician been made aware of additional 
warnings.58 
B. Exceptions to the Learned Intermediary Doctrine 
Courts have held that the LID does not apply—and thus liability 
attaches for a drug manufacturer’s failure to warn the consumer 
 
51. Dobbs et al., supra note 33, § 466 (citing Teresa Moran Schwartz, Consu–
mer-Directed Prescription Drug Advertising and the Learned Intermediary 
Rule, 46 Food Drug Cosm. L.J. 829, 831 (1991)). 
52. See Teresa Moran Schwartz, Consumer-Directed Prescription Drug Adver–
tising and the Learned Intermediary Rule, 46 Food Drug Cosm. L.J. 829, 
831 (1991). 
53. Cf. Restatement (Third) of Torts: Prods. Liab. § 6 cmt. b (Am. L. 
Inst. 1998) (“The rationale supporting this ‘learned intermediary’ rule is 
that only health-care professionals are in a position to understand the 
significance of the risks involved . . . .”). 
54. 726 F. App’x 753 (11th Cir. 2018). 
55. Id. at 756 (quoting Wyeth, Inc. v. Weeks, 159 So. 3d 649, 673 (Ala. 2014)). 
56. Id. at 754. 
57. Id. 
58. Id. at 757. 
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directly—in three circumstances: vaccine administration in mass-
vaccination settings,59 the prescription of contraceptives,60 and the use 
of marketing campaigns that directly target consumers.61 In mass-
inoculation settings, the healthcare providers are not in a position to 
relate the risks of the drug to each individual patient. Therefore, the 
law requires that the manufacturer warn the patient directly, so long 
as feasible and effective means for doing so are available.62 With 
contraceptives, the FDA requires that manufacturers include a package 
insert that contains patient warnings with each set of pills.63 When 
executing mass advertising campaigns for a drug directly to the con–
sumer, the manufacturer is required by federal regulations to accurately 
convey the risks associated with a drug in the advertisement.64 
More recently, courts have started applying a fourth exception for 
pharmacists. The exception for pharmacists is grounded in the 
distinction between the duty to communicate general risks about drug 
side effects and the duty to communicate specific risks that are known 
to the pharmacist.65 Such specific risks uniquely knowable by the 
pharmacist may, for example, be if an excessive quantity of a particular 
drug is being filled or if the FDA has recently withdrawn the drug from 
the market.66 Additional exceptions to the LID may be recognized at 
the state level, but the Restatement leaves the application of additional 
 
59. See, e.g., Davis v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 399 F.2d 121, 131 (9th Cir. 
1968). 
60. See, e.g., 1 O’Reilly & Van Tassel, supra note 9, § 14:53 (4th ed. 2020). 
61. See Restatement (Third) of Torts: Prods. Liab. § 6 reporters’ note 
to cmt. e (Am. L. Inst. 1998). 
62. Id.; Dobbs et al., supra note 33, § 466. 
63. Restatement (Third) of Torts: Prods. Liab. § 6 cmt. e (Am. L. Inst. 
1998); 21 C.F.R. § 310.501 (2019). But see West v. G.D. Searle & Co., 879 
S.W.2d 412, 414 (Ark. 1994) (stating that no direct warning to the consum–
er was given, but, nevertheless, the defendant complied with the regulatory 
requirements); Martin v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 661 N.E.2d 352, 354–57 (Ill. 
1996). 
64. Restatement (Third) of Torts: Prods. Liab. § 6 cmt. e (Am. L. Inst. 
1998). But see Watts v. Medicis Pharm. Corp., 365 P.3d 944, 949–51 (Ariz. 
2016) (declining to adopt the marketing exception by acknowledging that 
no other courts have adopted it and that the Restatement Third’s “different 
exception”—under which a warning to a patient is required “when the 
manufacturer knows or has reason to know that health-care providers will 
not be in a position to reduce the risks of harm in accordance with the 
instructions or warnings”—served a similar function (quoting id. § 6(d))). 
65. Dobbs et al., supra note 33, § 466; see Downing v. Hyland Pharmacy, 
194 P.3d 944, 949 (Utah 2008) (holding that the LID did not preclude a 
negligence action against a pharmacy for filling prescriptions for a drug 
that the FDA had withdrawn from the market). 
66. Dobbs et al., supra note 33, § 466. 
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exceptions up to “developing case law.”67 Even in light of these 
exceptions, the LID grants significant protection to prescription drug 
manufacturers, thereby making redress for injured patients more 
challenging. 
III. Direct-to-Consumer Marketing 
Under the LID framework, a prescription drug manufacturer has no 
duty to directly warn the patient of risk information if the manufacturer 
gives an adequate warning to the prescribing physician. However, the 
popularization of direct-to-consumer (“DTC”) marketing has changed 
the way patients receive information about their treatments. DTC 
marketing is advertising by a pharmaceutical company that targets 
consumers directly.68 This direct line of communication between the 
manufacturer and consumer disrupts many presumptions of the LID, 
including that the manufacturer lacks an effective means of commun–
ication with the consumer and that the physician is the only party 
directly receiving risk-benefit information within the physician-patient 
relationship.69 The potential that the harms of DTC may outweigh the 
benefits has called the attention of the FDA and courts, and this 
scrutiny is discussed in turn. 
A. FDA Regulation of Direct-to-Consumer Marketing 
In the 1962 amendments to the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act 
(“FDCA”), Congress granted the FDA the authority to regulate 
prescription drug advertising.70 The FDA has comprehensive juris–
diction over pharmaceutical advertising, “includ[ing] advertisements in 
published journals, magazines, other periodicals, and newspapers, and 
advertisements broadcast through media such as radio, television, and 
telephone communication systems.”71 In response to the rise of DTC 
advertising, the FDA has promulgated regulations to control and 
mitigate the risk that consumers will be misled by drug advertise–
ments.72 The FDA primarily evaluates a manufacturer’s use of DTC 
 
67. Restatement (Third) of Torts: Prods. Liab. § 6 reporters’ note to 
cmt. e (Am. L. Inst. 1998). 
68. 1 Charles S. Zimmerman, Pharmaceutical and Medical Device 
Litigation § 3:2 (2018).  
69. See 2 O’Reilly & Van Tassel, supra note 9, § 15:25. 
70. See 21 U.S.C. § 352 (2018); James L. Zelenay Jr., The Prescription Drug 
User Fee Act: Is a Faster Food and Drug Administration Always a Better 
Food and Drug Administration?, 60 Food & Drug L.J. 261, 266 (2005). 
71. 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(l)(1) (2019). 
72. Victor E. Schwartz, Cary Silverman, Michael J. Hulka & Christopher E. 
Appel, Marketing Pharmaceutical Products in the Twenty-First Century: 
An Analysis of the Continued Viability of Traditional Principles of Law in 
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marketing through the “major statement rule.”73 The major statement 
rule “requires the manufacturer to present a major statement that 
represents a ‘fair balance of risks and benefits’ as well as lists any side 
effects or contraindications of the drug.”74 The FDA attempts to protect 
consumers against misleading marketing campaigns by requiring that 
such advertisements “provide information that is truthful, balanced, 
and accurately described.”75 The manufacturer will also be subject to 
penalties if the advertisements are false, do not fairly balance the 
benefits of the drug against the side effects, or are otherwise 
misleading.76  
Research by the FDA indicates that DTC advertisements tend to 
give consumers “an exaggerated sense of . . . benefits” while simultane–
ously only providing part of the picture when it comes to the risks of a 
drug.77 Proponents of DTC marketing argue that drug advertisements 
help bolster a patient’s right to be informed about new treatments,78 
and manufacturers purport that these advertisements encourage 
consumers to take a more active role in their healthcare.79 Conversely, 
critics argue that DTC advertisements interfere with the doctor-patient 
relationship and encourage the overprescribing of medications, among 
other issues.80 Concerns ranging from the downplaying of potential 
product side effects to ads influencing consumers to demand unnecess–
 
the Age of Direct-to-Consumer Advertising, 32 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 
333, 344–46 (2009). 
73. Y. Tony Yang & Brian Chen, Legal Considerations for Social Media Mar–
keting by Pharmaceutical Industry, 69 Food & Drug L.J. 39, 44 (2014). 
74. Id. 




%20not%20misleading [https://perma.cc/7682-TPRJ] (last updated June 
19, 2015).  
76. 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(e)(5)–(7) (2008). 
77. Anna Wilde Mathews, FDA to Review Drug Marketing to Consumers, Wall 
St. J. (Aug. 2, 2005), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB11229418405140 
2127 [https://perma.cc/38E4-TQQL]; Kathryn J. Aikin, John L. Swasy 
& Amie C. Braman, Patient and Physician Attitudes and Behaviors 
Associated With DTC Promotion of Prescription Drugs—Summ–
ary of FDA Survey Research Results 107 (2004), https://www.fda. 
gov/media/112016/download [https://perma.cc/QBD4-JS68]. 
78. Zimmerman, supra note 68, § 3:2. 
79. Id. 
80. Id. 
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ary prescriptions have prompted heavy scrutiny of the practice from 
not only the FDA but Congress as well.81 
In addition to FDA regulations, the Federal Trade Commission 
(“FTC”) imposes similar enforcement mechanisms to protect consumers 
from unfair and deceptive trade practices.82 While the FDA has the 
primary responsibility for regulating advertising of prescription drugs 
specifically, the FTC “has primary responsibility with respect to the 
regulation of the truth or falsity of all advertising (other than labeling) 
of foods, drugs, devices, and cosmetics.”83 FTC guidance on drug 
advertising has purposes similar to those of the FDA: “(1) to ensure 
advertising is truthful and non-misleading, and (2) that prior to 
releasing an advertisement on a product, any objective product claims 
have been substantiated.”84 Allegations of deceit or fraud on the part of 
the manufacturer have particular relevance when scrutinizing labeling 
issues.85 
B. The Effect of Direct-to-Consumer Marketing on Application of the 
Learned Intermediary Doctrine 
The Restatement (Third) does not explicitly advise whether courts 
should allow an exception to the LID for manufacturers that advertise 
directly to consumers.86 In one respect, the use of DTC marketing may 
call into question the continued application of the LID by altering the 
underlying presumption that “drug manufacturers do not participate in 
the patient-physician decision.”87 Even so, courts may still find that 
DTC marketing should have little to no effect on the application of the 
LID, taking the Fifth Circuit’s stance that “as long as a physician-
 
81.  Mathews, supra note 77; Aikin, Swasy & Braman, supra note 77, at 107.  
82. See 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2018). 
83. Memorandum of Understanding Between the Fed. Trade Comm’n and the 




84. Megan Smith-Mady, Celebrity Drug Endorsements: Are Consumers Pro–
tected?, 43 Am. J.L. & Med. 139, 152 (2017). 
85. 2 O’Reilly & Van Tassel, supra note 9, § 15:18. 
86. Restatement (Third) of Torts: Prods. Liab. § 6 reporters’ note to 
cmt. e. (Am. L. Inst. 1998); see In re Norplant Contraceptive Prods. Liab. 
Litig., 215 F. Supp. 2d 795, 815–16 (E.D. Tex. 2002); Watts v. Medicis 
Pharm. Corp., 342 P.3d 847, 855 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2015), vacated, 365 P.3d 
944 (Ariz. 2016); Perez v. Wyeth Laboratories, 734 A.2d 1245, 1257 (N.J. 
1999). 
87. Yang & Chen, supra note 73, at 45. 
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patient relationships exists, the learned intermediary doctrine app–
lies.”88 
Since the duty to warn in DTC advertising cases is government 
mandated, if a court finds that a manufacturer has complied with 
relevant federal regulations, then the court may subsequently hold that 
any related state tort claims are federally preempted.89 In Perez v. 
Wyeth Laboratories,90 the New Jersey Supreme Court became the first 
state high court to recognize DTC marketing as an exception to the 
LID.91 In Perez, the plaintiffs experienced complications after having 
the Norplant contraceptive implanted. The plaintiffs asserted that the 
manufacturer should be held liable for their injuries because Wyeth 
executed a mass advertising campaign that was both directed at 
consumers and did not provide adequate warnings about the inherent 
dangers in using Norplant.92 In this landmark opinion, the New Jersey 
Supreme Court held that the LID did not shield the manufacturer from 
liability when the manufacturer sought to influence patients through 
targeted marketing campaigns.93 
As support for its decision to adopt a DTC marketing exception, 
the Perez court cited the ways in which the administration of healthcare 
has changed since the LID was first adopted.94 Specifically, the court 
noted that when the LID was first adopted, medical advice was 
primarily received at the doctor’s office, prescriptions were filled at 
neighborhood pharmacies, and “the prevailing attitude of law and 
medicine was that the ‘doctor knows best.’”95 By the time of this opin–
ion, and even more so today, the landscape of healthcare administration 
has changed dramatically.96 The court reasoned that the rise of 
managed care organizations, the increased accessibility of prescription 
 
88. In re Norplant Contraceptive Prods. Liab. Litig., 165 F.3d 374, 379 (5th 
Cir. 1999). 
89. Restatement (Third) of Torts: Prods. Liab. § 6 reporters’ note to 
cmt. e (Am. L. Inst. 1998). 
90. 734 A.2d 1245 (N.J. 1999). 
91. Corey Schaecher, “Ask Your Doctor If This Product is Right For You”: 
Perez v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., Direct-to-Consumer Advertising and the 
Future of the Learned Intermediary Doctrine in the Face of the Flood of 
Vioxx Claims, 26 St. Louis U. Pub. L. Rev. 421, 438 (2007). 
92. Perez, 734 A.2d at 1248. 
93. Id. at 1264. 
94. Id. at 1246–47, 1263. 
95. Id. at 1246–47 (quoting Logan v. Greenwich Hosp. Ass’n, 465 A.2d 294, 
299 (Conn. 1983)). 
96. Id.; Aaron George, The Physician-Patient Relationship Has Changed, Med. 
Econ. (Feb. 25, 2020), https://www.medicaleconomics.com/view/physici 
an-patient-relationship-has-changed [https://perma.cc/6DQ9-6JZ3]. 
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drugs, and the pervasiveness of mass marketing campaigns have 
changed the context within which the LID is applied and warranted 
rethinking the application of the LID in the DTC context.97 
Since the decision in Perez, only a few other courts have considered 
applying a DTC exception to the LID.98 In In re Norplant Contraceptive 
Products Liability Litigation,99 a federal district court in Texas 
considered a case that also involved injuries sustained from Norplant.100 
The court acknowledged Perez, but because “no other court in any 
jurisdiction ha[d] directly addressed an advertising exception to the 
learned intermediary doctrine, making New Jersey the only jurisdiction 
to recognize this exception,” it declined to extend the DTC exception.101 
A few other courts have called the LID into question based on DTC 
marketing, but Perez remains the only court to formally recognize a 
DTC exception. In State ex rel. Johnson & Johnson Corp. v. Karl,102 
the decedent was prescribed a heartburn medication by her primary 
care physician and died unexpectedly just three days after she began 
taking the drug.103 The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia held 
that prescription drug manufacturers have the same duty to warn as 
other product manufacturers, thereby rejecting the LID.104 However, 
this decision has since been superseded by a West Virginia statute that 
adopted the LID.105 
In light of the pervasiveness of DTC marketing campaigns, the 
Arizona Supreme Court held “that the learned intermediary principle 
is inconsistent with the state’s later-implemented comparative fault tort 
system because it allows a prescribing physician to bear all the 
responsibility for an inadequate warning given to a consumer, even if a 
manufacturer played a part in making the warning insufficient.”106 In 
 
97. Id. at 1255–56, 1263. 
98. Diane Fenner & James A. Morris, Jr., 5 Litigating Tort Cases § 
60:35 (2019).  
99. 215 F. Supp. 2d 795 (E.D. Tex. 2002). 
100. Id. at 800.  
101. Id. at 812. The Norplant court also noted that, at the time of the case, 48 
states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico all had either applied or 
recognized the LID without any relevant exceptions for Norplant. Id. at 
806. 
102. 647 S.E.2d 899 (W. Va. 2007). 
103. Id. at 901. 
104. Id. at 914. 
105. W. Va. Code § 55-7-30 (2016); J.C. ex rel. Michelle C. v. Pfizer, Inc., 814 
S.E.2d 234, 238 n.9 (W. Va. 2018). 
106. 2 O’Reilly & Van Tassel, supra note 9, § 15:25 (footnote omitted).  
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this case, Watts v. Medicis. Pharmaceutical Corp.,107 the plaintiff suff–
ered from drug-induced lupus after taking acne medication.108 The 
plaintiff argued that the manufacturer advertised the drug under false 
pretenses by omitting material risks in order to influence consumers to 
buy the product.109 The Arizona Court of Appeals refused to apply the 
LID, in part because of the manufacturer’s use of DTC marketing, 
which the court reasoned had both misled consumers and changed the 
nature of the relationship between the consumer and the “learned 
intermediary.”110 The decision in Watts was ultimately vacated by the 
Arizona Supreme Court, which declined to recognize a DTC exception 
to the LID.111 Instead of creating a DTC exception to protect consumers 
from deceptive marketing practices, the Court relied on section 6(d)(2) 
of the Third Restatement of Torts.112 This Restatement section requires 
that prescription drug manufacturers provide information on risks 
directly to consumers “when the manufacturer knows or has reason to 
know that health-care providers will not be in a position to reduce the 
risks of harm in accordance with the instructions or warnings.”113 
Even when pharmaceutical manufacturers launch extensive promo–
tional campaigns, plaintiffs must prove the prescribing physician was 
actually misled by the advertisements.114 In Dean v. Eli Lilly & Co., the 
Second Circuit declined to extend an LID exception even though the 
manufacturer extensively promoted the drug at issue.115 In Dean, the 
plaintiff asserted a failure-to-warn claim under state law, alleging that 
he developed diabetes from his schizophrenia medication.116 The court 
rejected the plaintiff’s claims because of his failure to cite any evidence 
that the overpromotion actually induced his physician to prescribe the 
medication.117 Even though the court acknowledged that “the record 
reflect[ed] a vigorous sales campaign,” it found the lack of evidence 
demonstrating that the manufacturer’s marketing campaign had 
 
107. 342 P.3d 847 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2015), vacated, 365 P.3d 944 (Ariz. 2016). 
108. Id. at 849. 
109. Id. at 849–50. 
110. Id. at 855–56. 
111. Watts, 365 P.3d at 953. 
112. Id. at 950. 
113. Id. at 950 (quoting Restatement (Third) of Torts: Prods. Liab. § 
6(d)(2) (Am. L. Inst. 1998)). 
114. Dean v. Eli Lilly & Co., 387 F. App’x. 28, 30 (2d Cir. 2010). 
115.  Id. at 30. 
116. Id. at 29. 
117. Id. at 30. 
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actually misled the plaintiff’s physician about the link between the drug 
and the development of diabetes to be fatal to the plaintiff’s claims.118 
The courts’ failure to extend a DTC exception to the LID comes in 
stark contrast to the pervasiveness of DTC advertising in the 
prescription drug industry. A 2005 study reported that, in just the 
previous year, Pfizer had spent $668 million on DTC advertising, Merck 
had spent $348 million, and Johnson & Johnson had spent $335 
million.119 Interestingly, only two developed countries, the United States 
and New Zealand, allow drug companies to advertise through mass 
media marketing campaigns.120 Nevertheless, as long as drug manu–
facturers remain compliant with relevant federal regulations, precedent 
indicates that the large majority of state courts will continue to apply 
the LID despite the harmful effects DTC marketing campaigns may 
have on the consumer. 
IV. Off-Label Drug Use and Promotion 
The FDA has distinct regulatory requirements for a manufacturer’s 
promotion of a drug for an off-label use. An “off-label” use of a drug 
refers to the use of a drug for something other than that for which the 
FDA has approved the drug.121 The “off-label use of drugs” can also 
describe the prescription of drugs “for indications and in dosages other 
than those expressly approved by the FDA.”122 As long as a drug is 
approved by the FDA for some purpose, a physician can prescribe that 
drug for an off-label use without violating any FDA regulations or 
federal laws.123 Physicians must be diligent, however, in their off-label 
prescribing practices in order to remain complaint with FDA standards. 
When a physician needs to deviate from customary care and prescribe 
a drug for an off-label use, the physician must only use reasonable 
innovation to do so.124 The reasonable innovation rule allows physicians 
to deviate from the norm and prescribe off-label based on the unique 
needs of the patient without running afoul of FDA regulations.125 
 
118. Id.  
119. Bloomberg News, Pfizer to Detail Drugs’ Risks and Consult Doctors Earlier, 
N.Y. Times (Aug. 12, 2005), https://www.nytimes.com/2005/08/12/busi 
ness/pfizer-to-detail-drugs-risks-and-consult-doctors-earlier.html [https:// 
perma.cc/A8LB-4MU9]. 
120. Yang & Chen, supra note 73, at 41. 
121. 2 O’Reilly & Van Tassel, supra note 9, § 15:59. 
122. Id. § 15:66. 
123. Id.  
124.  See Brook v. St. John’s Hickey Mem’l Hosp., 380 N.E.2d 72, 76 (Ind. 1978) 
(applying the reasonable innovation rule in practice). 
125. Id.  
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A. FDA Regulation of Off-Label Use 
1. FDA Label Approval Process 
As a regulatory matter, the FDA recognizes both that physicians 
prescribe off-label and that the FDCA does not place limitations on 
how a physician may use an approved drug.126 By permitting physicians 
to prescribe drugs off-label, regulators allow physicians to exercise some 
degree of creativity in the way they treat each individual patient. “Once 
the FDA has cleared a device for introduction into the stream of 
commerce, physicians may use the device in any manner they determine 
to be best for the patient, regardless of whether the FDA has approved 
the device for this usage.”127 “Off-label use does not violate federal law 
or FDA regulations because the FDA regulates the marketing and 
distribution of drugs in the United States, not the practice of medicine, 
which is the exclusive realm of individual states.”128 “Once a product 
has been approved for marketing, a physician may choose to prescribe 
it for uses or in treatment regimens or patient populations that are not 
included in approved labeling.” 129 
The FDA conducts its approval process for new drugs by reviewing 
the proposed labeling for the drug. A drug’s label includes all proposed 
claims about the drug’s risks and benefits and adequate directions for 
use.130 The FDA will approve a drug only if the uses approved by the 
FDA mirror the label uses.131 The approval process additionally entails 
reports by the manufacturer on the safety and efficacy of their drug.132 
All in all, from development to approval, getting a new drug on the 
market takes considerable time and money. Estimates indicate that it 
takes an average of approximately fifteen years for a drug to go from 
the early stages of research to approval by the FDA.133 It is additionally 
 
126. Foreword to the 62nd Edition of Physicians’ Desk Reference (62d ed. 
2008). 
127. Cooper v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 259 F.3d 194, 197 (4th Cir. 2001). 
128. 2 O’Reilly & Van Tassel, supra note 9, § 15:66. 
129. Foreword to the 62nd Edition of Physicians’ Desk Reference (62d ed. 
2008). 
130. See 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2018). 
131. 2 O’Reilly & Van Tassel, supra note 9, §§ 15:18–19. 
132. Id. § 15:18.  
133. See Richard J. Findlay, Originator Drug Development, 54 Food & Drug 
L.J. 227, 228 (1999). 
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estimated that the average monetary investment in a newly approved 
drug is over $1 billion dollars.134 
Since the FDA’s approval process is narrowly tailored to the factors 
(such as dose and patient population) studied for a specified use, any 
additional on-label use of that drug will require separate approval from 
the FDA.135 This means that if a manufacturer wants to change the 
label of its drug or wants to market the drug for an off-label use, then 
the manufacturer has to conduct additional clinical trials, among other 
steps, to obtain FDA approval for that additional use.136 On top of the 
extra time and expense required to conduct more clinical trials, drug 
manufacturers have incentives for not trying to gain approval for a new 
use of a market drug. For one, the manufacturer already enjoys the 
profits of the drug since it is already on the market. Since physicians 
have the freedom to prescribe the drug for an off-label use, there is little 
monetary incentive for the manufacturer to conduct trials for additional 
uses. Moreover, FDCA regulations prohibit manufacturers from diss–
eminating risk-benefit information about off-label uses anyway.137 
Therefore, even if the manufacturer were to conduct trials to gather 
this risk-benefit information, it would be prohibited from distributing 
the results. 
2. FDA Regulations on the Promotion of Off-Label Uses 
In general, the FDA’s narrow label approvals resulted in a vast 
growth of off-label prescribing.138 As noted in Section III, the FDA 
employs an expansive regulatory scheme that prohibits drug 
manufacturers from advertising their drug in a way that deceives or 
misleads the consumer.139 In addition, the FDA prohibits prescription 
drug manufacturers from marketing their drugs for uses that do not 
have FDA approval, i.e., off-label uses.140 “Permitting manufacturers to 
promote off-label uses of a new drug would completely undermine the 
 
134. Peter Landers, Cost of Developing a New Drug Increases to About $1.7 
Billion, Wall St. J. (Dec. 8, 2003, 12:01 AM), https://www.wsj.com/ 
articles/SB107083909136415400 [https://perma.cc/573S-AHZM]. 
135. Santosh V. Coutinho, License to Promote, or Just What the Doctor 
Ordered? The New FDA Guidance on Dissemination of Off-Label Reprints 
by Pharmaceutical Companies, 28 Temp. J. Sci. Tech & Env’t L. 279, 
287–88 (2009).  
136. Id. at 288. 
137. See 21 U.S.C. § 352 (2020). 
138. Sandra H. Johnson, Polluting Medical Judgment? False Assumptions in the 
Pursuit of False Claims Regarding Off-Label Prescribing, 9 Minn. J.L. Sci. 
& Tech. 61, 68 (2008). 
139.  Schwartz et al., supra note 72, at 344–46.  
140. Coutinho, supra note 135, at 281. 
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government’s interest in subjecting off-label uses to the FDA evaluation 
process as well as the government’s interest in preserving the integrity 
of the FDCA’s new drug approval process.”141 
In fact, manufacturers are restricted from sharing any information 
about an off-label use of their drug, truthful or otherwise.142 These 
regulations come with the caveat that the FDA prohibits manufacturers 
from promoting their drugs for off-label uses, but does not prohibit 
healthcare providers from prescribing drugs for off-label uses.143 There 
are both monetary and public health incentives for manufacturers to 
promote off-label uses of their drugs and courts have repeatedly held 
that off-label uses can be acceptable treatment options.144 However, 
drug manufacturers can face substantial civil and criminal liability 
when marketing their drugs for off-label uses, as this promotion can 
amount to a violation of the FDCA.145 For example, Genentech Inc., 
“one of the world’s largest biotechnology corporations, paid $50 million 
in criminal and civil fines in 1999 to settle charges that it illegally 
promoted the growth hormone Protropin for unapproved uses.”146 
This web of federal regulations creates a challenging dilemma in 
that these regulations pit the provider’s desire to obtain information 
about the benefits and risks of off-label drug therapies against the 
manufacturer’s desire to avoid subjecting themselves to years of 
lawsuits. This tension played out in the FDA’s regulation of pedicle 
screw spinal systems.147 The “pedicle screw” had become widely utilized 
by physicians for one of its off-label uses, and in the process had also 
become widely litigated.148 As a result, the FDA decided to review the 
 
141. 2 O’Reilly & Van Tassel, supra note 9, § 15:61. 
142. Christopher M. Wittich, Christopher M. Burkle & William L. Lanier, Ten 
Common Questions (and Their Answers) About Off-label Drug Use, 87 
Mayo Clinic Proc. 982, 988 (2012).  
143. Coutinho, supra note 135, at 281. 
144. Richard C. Ausness, “There’s Danger Here, Cherie!”: Liability for the Pro–
motion and Marketing of Drugs and Medical Devices for Off-Label Uses, 73 
Brook. L. Rev. 1253, 1255 & n.15 (2008) (citing Bristol-Meyers Squibb Co. 
v. Shalala, 91 F.3d 1493, 1500 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Ortho Pharm. Corp. v. 
Cosprophar, Inc., 32 F.3d 690, 692 (2d Cir. 1994); Upjohn Co. v. MacMurdo, 
562 So. 2d 680, 683 (Fla. 1990)). 
145. Id. at 1322. 
146. 2 O’Reilly & Van Tassel, supra note 9, § 15:37. 
147. See Orthopedic Devices: Classification and Reclassification of Pedicle Screw 
Spinal Systems, 63 Fed. Reg. 40,025, 40,033 (Jul. 27, 1998) (to be codified 
at 21 C.F.R. pt. 300). 
148. John Schwartz & Benjamin Weiser, The Tangled Path of FDA Review, 
Wash. Post (March 29, 1996), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive 
/politics/1996/03/29/the-tangled-path-of-fda-review/3e7fe546-8f31-415e-
89d6-788686a1285e/ [https://perma.cc/F6ML-E5Z7]. 
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device again and ultimately reclassified it to include the popularized 
off-label use as an FDA-approved label use.149 Subsequently, the FDA 
released guidance that addressed the issues at the heart of the pedicle 
screw cases.150 In relevant part, former FDA Commissioner Scott 
Gottlieb stated that “it’s our belief that giving companies clear 
guidelines for . . . truthful and non-misleading information about 
unapproved products and unapproved uses of approved or cleared 
products will help facilitate communications that can allow . . . 
coverage for these new products and new uses more quickly after FDA 
approval or clearance.”151 
From the perspective of physicians, prescribing off-label affords 
them the freedom to offer patients new treatment options based on the 
latest clinical research.152 A 2006 study estimated that approximately 
21% of prescriptions for commonly used medications were written for 
an off-label use.153 This number is projected to be even higher in some 
sub-populations. For example, one study found that 78.7% of children 
were prescribed at least one drug for an off-label use after being 
discharged from a pediatric hospital.154 Other sources report that off-
label drug use is often the most common and effective treatment for 
cancer patients.155 This practice is not without risk as off-label uses are 
 
149. Id. 
150. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Drug and Device Manufacturer Comm–
unications with Payors, Formulary Committees, and Similar 
Entities—Questions and Answers 16–22 (2018).  
151. Statement from FDA Commissioner Scott Gottlieb, M.D., on new efforts 
to advance medical product communications to support drug competition 




152. See Sandeep Kumar Gupta & Roopa Prasad Nayak, Off-label Use of 
Medicine: Perspective of Physicians, Patients, Pharmaceutical Companies 
and Regulatory Authorities, 5 J. Pharmacology & Pharmacothera–
peutics 88, 88 (2014). 
153. David C. Radley, Stan N. Finkelstein & Randall S. Stafford, Off-label 
Prescribing Among Office-Based Physicians, 166 Archives Internal 
Med. 1021, 1023, 1025 (2006). 
154. Samir S. Shah, Matthew Hall, Denise M. Goodman, Pamela Feuer, Vidya 
Sharma, Crayton Fargason, Jr., Daniel Hyman, Kathy Jenkins, Marjorie L. 
White, Fiona H. Levy, James E. Levin, David Bertoch & Anthony D. 
Slonim, Off-label Drug Use in Hospitalized Children, 161 Archives Pedia–
trics & Adolescent Med. 282, 283 (2007). 
155. Coutinho, supra note 135, at 288; see also William L. Christopher, Off-
Label Drug Prescription: Filling the Regulatory Vacuum, 48 Food & 
Drug L.J. 247, 248–49 (1993). 
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typically backed by little, if any, formal scientific evidence.156 Critics 
argue that promoting the off-label use of drugs undermines the FDA’s 
role in ensuring the safety of drugs on the market, discouraging manu–
facturers from performing safety and efficacy studies, and relatedly 
encouraging manufacturers to seek FDA approval for the narrowest and 
easiest to support use of their drugs.157 Yet prescribing a drug off-label 
allows physicians to give patients the opportunity to try experimental 
treatment options or try new treatments when all of the available FDA-
approved therapies have failed. Additionally, an off-label use may be 
the only treatment available for rare diseases that do not have any 
FDA-approved treatment options.158 Often, it is the patients’ own 
demand for alternative treatment options when the standard procedures 
have failed that influences a physician’s decision to experiment with 
off-label therapies.159 Thus, both physicians and patients benefit from 
the prescription of off-label medications. 
B. Reasonable Innovation Rule 
The FDA has recognized that the practice of medicine necessarily 
involves physicians prescribing some drugs for off-label uses.160 But if a 
physician does not follow proper protocols when prescribing off-label, 
her prescribing behaviors can move away from innovation and encroach 
on illegal human experimentation. This distinction is rooted in the 
reasonable innovation rule. Generally, physicians are making treatment 
decisions based on the average person with that illness and can treat 
using the customary standard of care. Customary care is evidence-
based, using “population level data on the safety and efficacy of medical 
interventions in order to produce generalizable knowledge with which 
to guide clinical decisionmaking.”161 But when a physician needs to 
deviate from customary care to treat a patient with unique needs, she 
may use reasonable innovation to do so.162 
Courts have generally recognized the need for physicians to inno–
vate when such care is reasonable under the circumstances. As early as 
 
156. Radley et al., supra note 153, at 1023. 
157. Maxwell J. Mehlman, Off-Label Prescribing, The Doctor Will See You 
Now (May 1, 2005), http://www.thedoctorwillseeyounow.com/content/ 
bioethics/art1971.html [ https://perma.cc/DX27-9495]. 
158. Coutinho, supra note 135, at 289. 
159. Gupta & Nayak, supra note 152, at 90. 
160. Foreword to the 62nd Edition of Physicians’ Desk Reference (62d ed. 
2008). 
161. Anna B. Laakman, When Should Physicians be Liable for Innovation?, 36 
Cardozo L. Rev. 913, 918 (2015). 
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1935, the Supreme Court of Michigan in Fortner v. Koch163 recognized 
that “if the general practice of medicine and surgery is to progress, there 
must be a certain amount of experimentation carried on.”164 In Brook 
v. St. John’s Hickey Memorial Hospital,165 the Supreme Court of Indiana 
reasoned that physicians are “presumed to have the knowledge and skill 
necessary to use some innovation to fit the peculiar circumstances of 
each case.”166 
Under the reasonable innovation rule, physicians may deviate from 
the “norm” by providing reasonable care under the circumstances based 
on the unique needs of the patient.167 “A physician provides standard 
treatment when she uses routine methods to treat patients, and she 
provides innovative treatment when she deliberately deviates from 
established practices in an attempt to improve patient outcomes.”168 
“Physician innovation includes performing novel medical and surgical 
procedures and prescribing drugs and devices for uses with unknown 
safety and efficacy.”169 Therefore, a physician may use reasonable 
innovation to prescribe a drug off-label for one of her patients. However, 
when a physician prescribes a drug off-label for all patients with a 
certain condition, this practice is no longer clinical innovation, but is 
instead considered illegal human experimentation.170 Put another way, 
off-label prescription by a physician constitutes human experimentation 
whenever the decision to prescribe off-label is not based on the unique 
needs of the patient. 
Regulations concerning research involving human subjects are 
promulgated by the FDA and the Department of Health and Human 
Services.171 For any clinical investigation, such as a physician trying an 
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165. 380 N.E.2d 72 (Ind. 1978). 
166. Id. at 76. 
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168. Laakman, supra note 161, at 938. 
169. Id. at 915. 
170. Myrisha S. Lewis, Halted Innovation: The Expansion of Federal Jurisdiction 
over Medicine and the Human Body, 2018 Utah L. Rev. 1073, 1089–90 
(2018). 
171. 21 C.F.R. § 56.101–124 (2018); 45 C.F.R. § 46.101–124 (2018). See also 
Bonnie M. Lee, Comparison of FDA and HHS Human Subject Protection 
Regulations, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., https://www.fda.gov/science-re 
search/good-clinical-practice-educational-materials/comparison-fda-and-
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off-label treatment on a group of patients, the FDA requires that the 
physician acquire approval for the treatment from an IRB.172 In 
practice, however, the FDA does not exercise strong oversight over all 
clinical trials and IRB-approved studies.173 The Office of the Inspector 
General has recognized these weaknesses, underscoring both that the 
FDA does not have a system in place to track all human trials and that 
it “lacks a comprehensive database for tracking its inspections of clinical 
trials.”174 This lack of organized data collection is a flaw repeated by 
physicians. By prescribing drugs off-label to patient groups without 
registering with an IRB and tracking the results, physicians are in 
actuality conducting illegal human experiments. 
V. Recommendation 
Deficits in the organization and dissemination of patient data 
regarding off-label drug uses leave patients vulnerable, both at the 
clinical stage as they accept the risks of their treatment, and further 
down the road if the patients suffer harm from their treatment and 
attempt to sue. Taken together, the restrictions on a manufacturer’s 
promotion of off-label risks, coupled with the practice of physicians 
prescribing drugs off-label and the reluctance of courts to recognize 
exceptions to the LID, leave patients at a disadvantage. Overall, the 
goal of this regulatory system should be, first and foremost, to protect 
patients. At the same time, the continued promotion of physician 
innovation through off-label prescribing is vital to providing patients 
access to the most effective treatment options for their needs. Because 
physicians are prescribing drugs off-label (and we want to encourage 
them to continue to), the best practice is to implement a comprehensive 
system for tracking this patient data. 
 
circumstances in which IRB review is mandated, waivers of FDA IRB re–
quirements, and lesser administrative actions available to the agency). 
172. Institutional Review Boards Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. Food & 
Drug Admin. (Jan. 1998), https://www.fda.gov/regulatoryinformation/ 
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Health & Human Servs. (Sept. 28, 2007), https://oig.hhs.gov/public 
ations/docs/press/2007/FDAClinicalTrials3.pdf [https://perma.cc/L225-6 
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174. Id. In 2007, the FDA created the Sentinel System to surveil electronic health 
records for post-market safety concerns. While this did increase the FDA’s 
surveillance ability, the system was not very successful at identifying prob–
lems; rather, it allowed the FDA to verify the existence of problems, but 
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the FDA. See W. Nicholson Price II, Drug Approval in a Learning Health 
System, 102 Minn. L. Rev. 2413, 2424–25 (2018). 
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A. Patient Registries in the Physician-Patient Relationship 
Aggregate and timely treatment data can be collected through 
patient registries. “A patient registry is an organized system that uses 
observational study methods to collect uniform data (clinical and other) 
to evaluate specified outcomes for a population defined by a particular 
disease, condition, or exposure . . . .”175 To include a patient in the 
patient registry, the prescribing physician must obtain that patient’s 
informed consent.176 Additionally, the physician will be subject to a 
duty to timely disclose adverse patient outcomes identified by the 
registry to their own patients. This continuous disclosure of patient 
outcomes across a nationwide pool gives the patient the ability to 
provide renewed consent based on updated risk information. Thus, to 
properly prescribe off-label using reasonable innovation without con–
ducting an illegal human experiment, physicians must both use a patient 
registry, with the patient’s informed consent, and monitor patient 
progress by timely disclosing adverse effects reported in the registry. 
For off-label treatments included in a registry, a patient’s informed 
consent is obtained during two phases of treatment: consent to the 
treatment itself and consent to having the patient’s health data made 
available through the registry. For the patient, this process will take 
place entirely in the clinical setting.177 After diagnosis of a condition of 
interest for the registry, the physician may recommend prescribing a 
drug off-label. As a best practice to ensure the physician is engaging in 
reasonable innovation and not conducting a human experiment,178 the 
physician will also recommend the patient be included in the registry. 
This way, the consent process takes place entirely within the scope of 
the physician-patient relationship.179 Importantly, a patient’s refusal to 
consent to inclusion in the registry is not a bar to receiving the off-label 
treatment. Rather, a patient’s denial of consent to the registry requires 
 
175. 1 Agency for Healthcare Rsch. & Quality, Registries for Eval–
uating Patient Outcomes: A User’s Guide 13 (Richard E. Gliklich, 
Nancy A. Dreyer & Michelle B. Leavy eds., 3d ed. 2014).  
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the prescribing physician to take separate precautions in order to 
adhere to the reasonable innovation rule when not safeguarded by the 
procedural protections created by the registry system. 
Importantly, with the increased digitization of medicine and patient 
records, any physician in the country who is prescribing the same 
treatment can enroll her patients in the same registry.180 The registry 
can then facilitate the identification of patterns across a nationwide 
dataset. If the registry shows a trend in adverse patient outcomes, it 
can promptly notify all physicians with patients in the registry, who 
must subsequently disclose this information to their patients. This 
notification requirement helps patients assess the risks of their off-label 
treatment on a continuous basis and, in the worst case, gives them an 
opportunity to timely withdraw if experiencing the same adverse effects 
as others in the registry in an attempt to mitigate potential harm. Even 
though the registry notification system imposes an additional duty on 
physicians, “[p]hysicians who recommend innovative care are [already] 
subject to heightened disclosure duties.”181 If the physician fails to 
timely disclose, then she will have breached her duty of informed 
consent to the patient and will be subject to existing liability regimes 
in tort to the patient.182 
B. Patient Registries and the FDA 
Patient registries can also be used to mitigate weaknesses at the 
regulatory level. The use of patient registries for off-label treatments 
can supply the FDA with data to monitor post-market safety of off-
label uses.183 The patient data collected by registries is commonly 
referred to as real-world evidence (“RWE”).184 RWE “is the clinical 
evidence regarding the usage and potential benefits or risks of a medical 
product derived from analysis of” patient health data.185 In 2017, the 
FDA approved a label change based on RWE for the first time.186 This 
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change was for an artificial transcatheter heart valve, initially approved 
by the FDA in 2011 to treat patients with a life-threatening heart 
problem.187 After the drug was put on the market, the manufacturer 
started tracking the use of its device, including the off-label use that 
led to the new indication in 2017.188 After reviewing approximately 600 
records relating to the off-label use from the manufacturer’s product 
registry, the FDA approved the off-label procedure without requiring a 
separate clinical trial.189 This FDA milestone was accomplished at 
approximately the same time Congress passed the 21st Century 
America Cures Act (“Cures Act”).190 Pursuant to the Cures Act, the 
FDA “created a framework for evaluating the potential use of [RWE] 
to help support the approval of a new indication for a drug already 
approved . . . or to help support or satisfy drug postapproval study 
requirements.”191 Accordingly, the widespread adoption of patient 
registries can further the legislative goal of the Cures Act by providing 
the FDA with data for label change considerations. 
In addition to monitoring patient registry data for label changes, 
the FDA can utilize this data to hold manufacturers more accountable 
for the risks associated with their market drugs. With off-label risk 
information accessible through patient registries, manufacturers can no 
longer circumvent FDCA regulations by claiming the risk-benefit 
information for off-label uses of their drug was not available. The risks 
collected through patient registries and communicated to the FDA then 
become known risks that the manufacturer must communicate to the 
learned intermediary.192 The data collected by the registries thereby 
serves to better protect patients by increasing the accountability of 
manufacturers to prescribing physicians—the intermediary—and places 
a higher burden on the manufacturer to dispel its duty to warn under 
the LID.  
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Conclusion 
Through the implementation of patient registries, patients can be 
better protected against the infliction of harm in the first place, 
alleviating the pressure on courts to remedy these harms through the 
LID. The coordination of patient data among physicians, the FDA, and 
drug manufacturers increases transparency and accountability in off-
label treatment programs. The use of nationwide patient registries also 
acknowledges the vital role technology now plays in the administration 
of healthcare. This sentiment has been recognized by courts for decades. 
In Hall v. Hilbun,193 the Supreme Court of Mississippi noted that the 
practice of medicine has changed such that physicians attend the same 
universities, are subject to the same training, and then move to practice 
across the country, where they have the same access to evolving medical 
knowledge.194 “Our law is not administered in isolation, any more than 
the physicians who practice in this state work in isolation from the rest 
of the country.”195 
The implementation of RWE systems in everyday clinical practice 
is nonetheless a shift away from the existing paradigm. Traditionally, 
“systematic learning about health care takes place principally in clinical 
trials, and not much in clinical care.”196 However, with the adoption of 
patient registries for off-label treatments, there would be a shift towards 
a “learning health system,” where “data [is] continuously collected in 
ongoing clinical care” and used to benefit the patient in real time and 




193. 466 So. 2d 856 (Miss. 1985). 
194. Id. at 870. 
195. Id. at 867. 
196. Price II, supra note 174, at 2414. 
197. Rachel E. Sherman, Steven A. Anderson, Gerald J. Dal Pan, Gerry W. Gray, 
Thomas Gross, Nina L. Hunter, Lisa LaVange, Danica Marinac-Dabic, Peter 
W. Marks, Melissa A. Robb, Jeffrey Shuren, Robert Temple, Janet Woodcock, 
Lilly Q. Yue & Robert M. Califf, Real-World Evidence—What Is It and What 
Can It Tell Us?, New Engl. J. Med. 2294 (2016). 
†  B.A., Duke University; J.D., Case Western Reserve University School of 
Law; MPH Candidate, Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health. 
The author thanks Professor Jonathan Entin for his insightful feedback and 
the editors of Case Western Reserve Law Review for their careful editing. 
Additionally, this Note would not be possible without the guidance and 
encouragement of Professor Katharine Van Tassel. 
